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Australia has been aƩempƟng to normalize its fractured relaƟonship with Fiji since the republic’s return to 
parliamentary democracy in 2014.  RelaƟons were ruptured signiﬁcantly by an Australian‐led sancƟons 
regime following the 2006 military coup.  The Government of Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, however, has 
expressed liƩle interest in returning to the “tradiƟonal” arrangements with Australia.   Forging a new 
working relaƟonship in 2018, an elecƟon year in Fiji, promises to be just as challenging for both countries 
as in any previous year.   
 
Finding a new but mutually supported equilibrium is not enƟrely a bilateral process ‐ there is a “dragon in 
the room” which cannot be ignored.  Many in Fiji believe the Chinese were in Fiji’s corner when the 
country needed a signiﬁcant internaƟonal friend to manage the isolaƟon it felt in the wake of the 2006 
coup sancƟons.  Australia, for its part, knows that Fiji sees China as providing an economic, diplomaƟc and 
aid alternaƟve to tradiƟonal friends that was not available in previous decades.   
 
At a bilateral level, Canberra opened 2018 with a new start in Suva.  John Feakes, a career diplomat, was 
appointed High Commissioner to Fiji in November 2017 replacing Margaret Toomey who had had a 
someƟmes‐rocky relaƟonship with the Bainimarama Government.  Feakes carried no poliƟcal baggage 
into Fiji but he came with experience in the United NaƟons and in mid‐East conﬂict areas – a useful 
background in light of Fiji’s peacekeeping commitments.    
 
However, the smoke of the New Year’s ﬁreworks had hardly cleared from the Sydney Harbour Bridge 
before Canberra set oﬀ some poliƟcal pyrotechnics over the Paciﬁc Island region with implicaƟons for Fiji.   
 
Australia’s InternaƟonal Development Minister, ConceƩa FierravanƟ‐Wells assailed China’s Paciﬁc aid 
programs in early January 2018 claiming many buildings were “useless” and the roads went “nowhere”.  
Moreover, she asserted, the concessional loans funding these projects imposed an unsustainable debt 
burden on the recipient countries.    
 
Her aƩack appeared somewhat at odds with the November 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.  The White 
Paper did reﬂect the Government’s concerns over China’s expanding security inﬂuence in Indo‐Paciﬁc 
region but compeƟƟon with China for leadership in the South Paciﬁc was tacƞully avoided in the chapter 
on regional relaƟons.   
 
The FierravanƟ‐Wells criƟcism of China’s approach to regional aid, however, served to conﬁrm what many 
in Suva had believed for nearly a decade. Finding a new normal in relaƟons between Fiji and Australia 
necessarily will involve a triangular approach ‐ balancing Australian and Chinese interests with Fiji’s 
aspiraƟons.     
The White Paper argued for engaging with the Paciﬁc Island region “with greater intensity and ambiƟon” 
inter alia through ‘promoƟng economic cooperaƟon and greater integraƟon within the Paciﬁc and also 
with the Australian and New Zealand economies”.  The focus for achieving this objecƟve has been to 
secure regional support for an extension of the Paciﬁc Agreement on Closer Economic RelaƟons (PACER) 
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to establish a free trade amongst the Paciﬁc Islands Forum states and both Australia and New 
Zealand known as PACER Plus.   
 
In April 2017 Fiji and Papua New Guinea declined to sign the PACER Plus Agreement arguing that 
the trade deal would hurt their developing industries while giving greater access to Australian 
and New Zealand to regional markets.   Their decision has been crippling for PACER Plus since 
these two economies account for about 80% of the regional output.   
 
The month following the PACER Plus decision, Prime Minister Bainimarama was in Shanghai to 
support China’s Belt and Road IniƟaƟve (BRI) for economic integraƟon.  His support was 
underscored by the announcement that he was closing Fiji’s trade oﬃce in Taipei.  It is clear that 
both China and Fiji hope to use Fiji’s status as a regional hub to support the BRI project.   
 
China is currently the region’s second largest source for development assistance and the largest 
donor to Fiji, having overtaken Australia and New Zealand in the years since the 2006 military 
coup.  Trade also supports a strong Chinese presence in regional economies.  China has become 
the primary source of imports into Fiji ahead of New Zealand, Australia, and Singapore.  It ranks 
fourth in taking Fijian exports behind the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.   
 
Beyond aid and trade, China’s cultural footprint in Fiji is increasing.  While Fiji’s key tourism 
industry conƟnues to be dominated by tradiƟonal sources – Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States, the growth in visitors from China has been rapid.   Although it lags well behind the 
ﬁgures from Australia and New Zealand, Chinese tourists now outnumber tourists from all other 
Asian origin countries combined with these numbers expected to rise in the future as a share of 
all visitors to Fiji.   China is also developing a proﬁle as a desƟnaƟon for Fijian students and for 
professional training. 
 
As much as Canberra may regret compeƟng with Beijing for inﬂuence in Suva, the rise of China’s 
proﬁle has not been without domesƟc consequences in Fiji.  Some in Fiji have become concerned 
that China has become too closely connected to oﬃcial sources of power through a signiﬁcant 
bureaucraƟc China lobby with the Government, as well as through its commercial investment in 
the Fijian economy.   
 
The deportaƟon of alleged Chinese criminals from Fiji to China in August 2017 shone a spotlight 
on the issues both posiƟvely and negaƟvely.  For some Fijians, it demonstrated the value of close 
cooperaƟon with Chinese law enforcement to deal with Chinese crime.  Others were more 
concerned with the secrecy and lack of apparent due process in the removal from Fiji of 77 
individuals hooded, manacled, and frog‐marched on to a Chinese airplane by a police force in 
foreign uniforms operaƟng on Fijian soil.   
 
RelaƟons with China may become an issue in this year’s general elecƟon. SiƟveni Rabuka, the 
1987 coup leader and now leader of SODELPA, the main opposiƟon party, has quesƟoned the 
value of Chinese aid.  He has supported FierravanƟ‐Wells’ concerns that the size of the debt from 
Chinese concessional loans has become unsustainable.    
 
Normalizing the relaƟonship with Fiji during 2018 could never mean returning to the pre‐2006 
relaƟons for Australian policy makers. However, managing a new normal will conƟnue to be 
elusive unƟl the triangular dynamics of Fiji’s relaƟonships with China and Australia are made 
rouƟne.  Fiji’s response to the White Paper as amended by FieravanƟ‐Wells and the outcome of 
Fiji’s elecƟon will bear close scruƟny for its implicaƟons for the future of Australia‐Fiji relaƟons.   
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